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  Placing global production networks (GPN) on the Internet poses a fundamental 
challenge, but also creates new opportunities for managing in Developing Asia. Network 
flagships can now select best-performing suppliers on a global scale, increasing the 
pressure on Asian suppliers. But the transition from EDI to the Internet may also provide 
new opportunities for Asian suppliers, by reducing barriers to network entry, and by 
enhancing knowledge diffusion.  
 
A conceptual framework is introduced to assess how the Internet reshapes business 
organization and GPN. That framework is applied to one of the role models of managing 
in Asia, Taiwan´s Acer Group. The paper highlights a vicious circle that must be broken 
to reap the benefits of the Internet: Asian firms must reduce a huge efficiency gap 
between manufacturing and the management of supporting digital information systems 
(DIS). The challenge is to embrace the Internet as flexible infrastructures that support not 
only information exchange, but also knowledge sharing, creation and utilization. The 
Internet facilitates this task: it provides new opportunities for the outsourcing of mission-
critical support services.  
(181 words) 
 
Introduction: A New Agenda for Managing in Asia 
 
A progressive liberalization and deregulation of international trade and 
investment, and the rapid development and diffusion of information and communication 
technology (IT) have fundamentally changed the global dynamics of competition (Ernst, 
2001a). Intense price competition needs to be combined with product differentiation, in a 
situation where continuous price wars erode profit margins. Of critical importance, 
however, is speed-to-market: getting the right product to the largest volume segment of 
the market right on time can provide huge profits. Being late can be a disaster, and may 
even drive a firm out of business. The result has been an increasing uncertainty and 
volatility, and a destabilization of established market leadership positions (Richardson, 
1996; Ernst, 1998).  
 
This growing complexity of competition has changed the determinants of firm 
organization and growth, as well as the determinants of location. Three interrelated 
transformations have occurred in the cross-national organization of business. First, global 
production networks (GPN) have proliferated as a major organizational innovation in 
global operations (e.g., Ernst, 1997; Ernst, 2002). These networks help global 
corporations (the “network flagships”) to sustain their competitiveness, by providing 
them with access to specialized suppliers at lower-cost locations that excel in quick and 
flexible response to the flagships’ requirements. Second, GPN have acted as a catalyst for 
international knowledge diffusion, providing new opportunities for local capability 
formation in lower-cost locations outside the industrial heartlands of North America, 
Western Europe and Japan (Ernst, 2001b; Ernst and Kim, 2001). Third, a long-term 
process of “digital convergence” (e.g., Chandler and Cortada, 2000), enabling the same 
infrastructure to accommodate manipulation and transmission of voice, video, and data, has created new opportunities for organizational learning and knowledge exchange across 
organizational and national boundaries, hence magnifying the first two transformations.  
 
There are widespread expectations that the Internet, the latest incarnation of digital 
convergence, may further accelerate these transformations (e.g., Department of 
Commerce, 2000b). By transmitting information in digital format instantly, and at much 
lower cost than earlier technology generations (like electronic data interchange, EDI), the 
Internet substantially broadens the scope for collaboration across organizational and 
national boundaries. A new generation of networking software provides flexible 
infrastructures that, computer scientists claim, “support not only information exchange, 
but also knowledge sharing, creation and utilization.” (Jørgensen and Krogstie, 2000). 
The key is the open-ended structure of the Internet, which allows extra networks to be 
added at any point, creating almost unlimited opportunities for outsourcing and the 
diffusion of knowledge. 
 
Placing GPN on the Internet will have important - but as yet uncertain - implications 
for Developing Asia
1, a region that has seen a progressive integration into GPN (Borrus, 
Ernst, and Haggard, 2000; Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999)
2. This transformation may 
strengthen further the dominant position of global network flagships, providing them 
with new opportunities for effective time management, knowledge outsourcing, and the 
rationalization of global supply chains. Flagships now have much greater opportunities to 
select best-performing suppliers on a global scale, increasing the pressures on Asian 
suppliers. On the other hand, the transition from EDI to the Internet may also provide 
new opportunities for Asian firms, by reducing barriers to network entry, and by 
enhancing knowledge diffusion. 
 
There is a huge efficiency gap between Asia’s manufacturing systems and the 
management of supporting digital information systems. The challenge is to reduce this 
gap as quickly as possible by embracing the Internet as a core business function. A 
vicious circle needs to be broken: a belated transition to digital information systems has 
prevented the accumulation of knowledge of how to design and implement an appropriate 
IT organization that reflects the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of diverse Asian 
management systems. Limited financial and human resources imply that in-house efforts 
need to be supplemented with outsourcing of IT services. The Internet facilitates this 
task: it provides opportunities for the outsourcing of mission-critical support services, 
such as ERP (enterprise resource planning), HRM (human resource management), SCM 
(supply chain management) and CRM (customer relations management). Furthermore, 
fierce competition among major producers of Internet software and networking 
equipment has created a buyers` market - placing Asian firms in a reasonably strong 
bargaining position. They may also find it easier to recruit specialized IT skills, due to 
massive retrenchments in the US and Europe. 
                                                            
1 These issues are addressed in an international policy-oriented research project, coordinated by 
the East-West Center, on “Placing the Networks on the Internet - Global Production Networks 
and Local Capability Formation in Developing Asia”.  
2 These networks now integrate the region’s geographically dispersed, yet concentrated and 
specialized clusters that feed into triangular trade (Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998). 
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A conceptual framework is introduced in parts 1 to 3 to assess how the Internet 
reshapes business organization and GPN. We first highlight expected benefits from 
Internet-enabled transformations of business organization. In part 2, we argue that the 
real issue is to analyze how the Internet reshapes the organization of global production 
networks. In part 3, we assess conflicting claims on how an increased use of the Internet 
to manage global production networks will affect Asian firms. That framework is then 
applied to one of the role models of managing in Asia, Taiwan´s Acer Group, to highlight 
the challenges and opportunities (parts 4 and 5). 
 
1.  Expected Benefits - A Taxonomy 
 
Surprisingly, the impact of the Internet on business organization is still a largely 
neglected research topic. Until recently, important contributions to information 
management neglect and hardly mention the Internet and the world-wide web
3. Very little 
research exists on how the Internet reshapes business strategy and organization, and how 
this affects industry structure
4. A simple taxonomy can help to identify expected benefits 
from Internet-enabled changes of business organization. The Internet transforms 
economic transactions, by reducing the cost and speed of communication, and by 
enhancing the scope for knowledge diffusion. Three benefits can be distinguished: 




It is argued that the new “digital markets” created by the Internet will increase the 
“marketization” of economic transactions (e.g., Department of Commerce, 2000a). The 
Internet certainly enables sellers to reach a broader market much more rapidly: a 
company that has an on-line business potentially has a worldwide market. Equally 
important is a qualitative improvement in market intelligence: sellers are now in a much 
better position to track and analyze their customer´s needs and purchasing habits
5. In 
turn, the Internet provides buyers with a wider selection of suppliers. It also provides 
them with a powerful tool for comparing alternative offers, in terms of prices, quality and 
delivery conditions. 
It would be misleading however to expect that the Internet will change relative 
positions of economic power between buyers and sellers. For instance, earlier 
expectations that the Internet will shift market power to buyers, especially in business-to-
consumer (B2C) markets, have failed to materialize. The same is true for the initial hype 
that the Internet would bring about a pervasive “disintermediation” of economic relations 
                                                            
3 An important book like Strategic Planning for Information Systems (Ward and Griffiths, 1996) 
mentions the Internet just once, but then as a synonym for the information super highway. And 
the edited volume Global Information Technology and Systems management (Palvia et al, 1996) 
mentions the Internet briefly three times on its more than 600 pages, but fails to provide an 
explicit analysis. 
4 Noteworthy exceptions are Nolan (2000), Hagstrøm (2000), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), and 
Evans and Wurster (2000). 
5This has raised concerns about invasion of data privacy.  
  3 that would drive down prices and would render markets ever more transparent. The basic 
laws of competitive dynamics continue to matter; they may be modified, but they have 




Following Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), we argue that the impact of the Internet 
on economic performance is mediated by a combination of intangible inputs as well as 
intangible outputs that act as powerful catalysts for organizational innovations. Intangible 
inputs include, for instance, the development of new software and databases; the 
adjustment of existing business processes; the recruitment of specialized human 
resources and their continuous upgrading; and, induced by all of this, the transformation 
of existing organizational structures and business strategies. Of equal importance are 
intangible outputs that would not exist without the Internet, like speed of delivery, 
flexible customization, the transition to a built-to-order (BTO) production model, and 
improved customer-relations management (CRM).  
 
After a while, these induced organizational changes lead to productivity growth, 
by reducing the cost of coordination, communications and information processing. Most 
importantly,  these organizational changes enable firms “to increase output quality in the 
form of new products or in improvements in intangible aspects of existing products like 
convenience, timeliness, quality and variety.” (Brynjolfson and Hitt, 2000, p.4). In short, 
we are talking about a complex process that involves a set of inter-related (“systemic”) 
changes: by combining the Internet with changes in work practices, strategies, and 
products and services, a firm transforms its organization as well as its relations with 
suppliers, partners and customers.  
 
The possible benefits from an Internet-enabled transformation of business 
organizations are enormous. The Internet provides ample scope for cost reduction across 
all stages of the production process both for the flagship company and Asian suppliers. 
Procurement costs can be reduced by means of expanded markets and increased 
competition through Internet-enabled online procurement systems. Another cost-reducing 
option is to shift sales and information dissemination to lower-cost channels. By moving 
customer service and technical support online, for example, Cisco Systems, a leading 
networking equipment vendor, increased productivity by 200–300 per-cent, resulting in 
savings of $125 million in customer service costs. 
 
The Internet can also drastically accelerate speed-to-market by reducing the time 
it takes to transmit, receive, and process routine business communications such as 
purchase orders, invoices, and shipping notifications. The Internet has greatly expanded 
the scope for information management: documents and technical drawings can be 
exchanged in real time, legally recognized signatures can be authenticated, browsers can 
be used to access the information systems of suppliers and customers, and transactions 
can be completed much more quickly. 
 
  4 A further advantage can be found in the low cost of expanding a functioning 
network. While establishing a network requires large upfront fixed investment costs 
(purchasing equipment, laying new cable, training), the cost of adding an additional user 
to the network is negligible. The value of the network thus increases with the number of 
participants (“network externalities”). 
 
An especially important benefit is a reduced trade-off between the richness and 
the reach of information (Evans and Wurster, 2000). Until recently, more complex, 
detailed, nuanced information could only be shared by a very small number of people; in-
creasing the “reach” of such information sharing requires a reduction in “richness.” The 
Internet provides far greater opportunities to share rich information with a far greater 




The open-ended structure of the Internet substantially broadens the scope for 
outsourcing. Both network flagships and first-tier suppliers have shifted from partial 
outsourcing, covering the nuts and bolts of manufacturing, to systemic outsourcing that 
includes knowledge-intensive support services. This has intensified the competition 
among the providers of outsourcing services: competition now focuses on the capacity to 
provide manufacturing and design services wherever required
6. What matters is the 
variety of outsourcing arrangements that the Internet has generated. Our first example 
concerns the outsourcing of logistics services. FedEx, for example orchestrates the 
assembly and shipping of laptop computers for Fujitsu; this has enabled Fujitsu to reduce 
the time consumers have to wait for an order from 10 days to 3 or 4 days. By turning over 
much of its computerized distribution system to FedEx, Fujitsu has been able to remove 
the warehousing and inventory costs from its supply chain, cutting inventory 90 percent. 
 
Increasingly however the focus of outsourcing is shifting to knowledge-intensive 
support services, including most aspects of information management. For instance, 
Internet service providers (ISP) provide fee-based access to Internet applications and 
resources for individuals and companies. Web hosting refers to the outsourcing of web 
site design and maintenance to specialized third party companies that can reap economies 
of scale and scope. And application service providers (ASP) provide mission-critical 
applications, such as ERP, HRM, SCM and CRM on a subscription basis. 
 
While the Internet acts as an important enabling technology, there are additional 
reasons to expect outsourcing pressures to grow: the IT skills shortage
7; the speed and 
                                                            
6 Take the electronics industry. For lower-cost outsourcing, network flagships can now choose 
between alternative locations, established by major contract manufacturers in Asia, Latin 
America, the former Soviet bloc, and the European periphery. For higher-end outsourcing, 
flagships can choose between specialized clusters in Nordic countries, the US, France and 
Germany, as well as Israel, Ireland, and Hungary 
7 During 2000, it was projected that 50% of the 1.6 million IT-related jobs in the US would remain 
unfilled (Information Technology Association of America, May 10, 2000, at: www.ita.org). Since  
then, however, the global downturn in the electronics industry has relieved this pressure. Massive 
retrenchments in the US and Europe may now increase ( at least for a while) developing Asia`s 
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anyway to sustain large in-house IT workforces; and the high life-cycle costs of 
purchasing and maintaining networking equipment and Internet applications
8. Equally 
important is that intense competition among major producers of Internet software and 
networking equipment has created a buyers` market, forcing major vendors to rely on 
outsourcing as an important market penetration strategy. 
 




Our next step is to clarify two misconceptions that have dominated management 
debates in Developing Asia on the impact of the Internet. First, there has been a 
disproportionate concern with the role of business-to-consumer dotcoms. This is in sharp 
contrast to the development of the global E-commerce market, where business-to-
business (B2B) transactions grow in leaps and bounds, leaving behind B2C transactions. 
Second, the established terminology is confusing, and obscures an important aspect of 
the transformation of business organization. The key word is e-commerce which is 
defined as transactions made over computer networks, such as EDI or the Internet, 
between unrelated buyers and sellers (e.g., Department of Commerce, 2000a:1). E-
commerce implies that the Internet creates new “digital markets” and hence will increase 
the “marketization” of economic transactions. This neglects a fundamental characteristic 
of contemporary competitive dynamics: A large share of economic transactions actually 
takes place within GPN, established by large MNEs (the network flagships). The real 
issue then is to assess the effect of the Internet on the organization of such networks, and 
to explore how this affects managing in Developing Asia. 
 
Hierarchical Global Production Networks 
 
GPN integrate the dispersed supply and customer bases of the network flagship, i.e. 
its subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, its suppliers and subcontractors, its 
distribution channels and value-added resellers, as well as its R&D alliances and 
cooperative agreements, such as standards consortia
9. This may, or may not, involve 
ownership of equity stakes. These networks do not necessarily give rise to less 
hierarchical forms of firm organization (as predicted for instance in Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989; Nohria and Eccles, 1992). Network participants differ in their position within such 
networks, and hence face very different challenges. We use a taxonomy that distinguishes 
various hierarchical layers of participants that range from flagship companies that 
dominate such networks, down to a variety of usually smaller, local network participants 
(Ernst, 2000b). The flagship is at the heart of a network: it provides strategic and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
access to IT skills. 
8 While intense competition reduces unit prices of Internet software and networking equipment, 
the frantic pace of technological change in both areas has drastically cut product-life cycles. For 
each generation, this has increased the life cycle costs of purchase and maintenance. 
9 For details, see e.g., Ernst, 1994, 1997a, 1997b, 2001b, and Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999. For 
empirical case studies on diverse GPN, see Borrus, Ernst and Haggard (eds.), 2000. 
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directly under its management control (Rugman, 1997: 182). 
 
A global flagship breaks down the value chain into a variety of discrete functions 
and locates them wherever they can be carried out most effectively, where they improve 
the firm’s access to resources and capabilities, and where they are needed to facilitate the 
penetration of important growth markets. This reflects increasing pressures to exploit 
complementarities that result from the systemic nature of knowledge (Antonelli, 1998). 
The strategy of the flagship thus directly affects the growth, the strategic direction and 
network position of lower-end participants, like specialized suppliers and subcontractors 
from Developing Asia. The latter, in turn, “ have no reciprocal influence over the 
flagship strategy” (Rugman and D´Cruz, 2000, p.84)
10. The flagship derives its strength 
from its control over critical resources and capabilities that facilitate innovation (e.g., 
Lazonick, 2000), and from its capacity to coordinate transactions and knowledge 
exchange between the different network nodes. Both are the sources of its superior 
capacity for generating profits.  
 
Increasing vertical specialization is the fundamental driver of this flagship model 
of industrial organization (Ernst, 2001a). Flagships retain in-house activities in which 
they have a particular strategic advantage; they outsource those in which they do not. It is 
important to emphasize the diversity of such outsourcing patterns (Mowery and Macher, 
2001; Ernst, 1997b). Some flagships focus on design, product development and 
marketing, outsourcing volume manufacturing and related support services. Other 
flagships outsource as well a variety of high-end, knowledge-intensive support services. 
This includes for instance trial production (prototyping and ramping-up), tooling and 
equipment, benchmarking of productivity, testing, process adaptation, product 
customization and supply chain coordination. It may also include design and product 
development.  
 
The result is that an increasing share of the value-added becomes dispersed across 
the boundaries of the firm as well as across national borders. Even if these activities do 
not involve formal R&D, they may still require a substantial exchange of knowledge. 
Hence, under certain conditions, global production networks may enhance the diffusion 
of knowledge across firm boundaries and national borders and, arguably, improve the 




Carriers of Knowledge Diffusion 
 
                                                            
10 With Rugman`s flagship model, we share the emphasis on the hierarchical nature of these 
networks. However, there are important differences. Rugman and D`Cruz (2000) focus on 
localized networks within a region; they also include “non-business infrastructure” as “network 
partners”. We do not share their assumption that a combination of transaction cost and resource-
based theory is sufficient to explain such forms of business organization. 
  7 Let us recapitulate the fundamental rationale of GPN: they help flagships to 
sustain their competitiveness, by providing them with access to specialized suppliers at 
lower-cost locations that excel in quick and flexible response to the flagships` 
requirements. The flagships can exert considerable pressure on local suppliers, especially 
in small developing countries: they can discipline suppliers by threatening to drop them 
from the networks whenever they fail to provide the required services at low price and 
world class quality.  
 
At the same time, GPN also may act as powerful carriers of knowledge. Two 
effects can be distinguished: First, GPN can act as a conduit for knowledge diffusion for 
state-of-the-art management approaches as well as product and process technologies, 
including the required tacit knowledge. At the same time, the requirements of network 
flagships can also provide both pressures and incentives to catalyze knowledge creation 
and capability development within firms and industrial districts in small economies. 
 
Flagships need to transfer technical and managerial knowledge to the local 
suppliers. This is necessary to upgrade the suppliers` technical and managerial skills, so 
that they can meet the technical specifications of the flagships. Second, once a network 
supplier successfully upgrades its capabilities, this creates an incentive for flagships to 
transfer more sophisticated knowledge, including engineering, product and process 
development. This reflects the increasingly demanding competitive requirements that we 
referred to earlier. In the electronics industry for instance, product-life-cycles have been 
cut to six months, and sometimes less (Ernst, 2001a). Overseas production thus 
frequently occurs soon after the launching of new products. This is only possible if 
flagships share key design information more freely with overseas affiliates and suppliers. 
Speed-to-market requires that engineers across the different nodes of an GPN are plugged 
into the flagship´s design debates (both on-line and face-to-face) on a regular basis. 
 
  In short, GPN expose local suppliers to the flagship`s management practices and 
technological knowledge. International technology transfer has been extensively studied, 
but research has primarily focused on such formal mechanisms as foreign direct 
investment and foreign licensing. These formal mechanisms, however, are only the tip of 
the iceberg. A larger amount of technical knowledge is transferred through various 
informal mechanisms that involve a substantial amount of tacit knowledge (e.g., 
Westphal, Kim and dahlman, 1985; Wong, 1991; Kim, 1997; Ernst, Ganiatsos and 
Mytelka, 1998; Saxenian, 2001; Ernst, 2000). This includes early supplier involvement in 
product design and prototype development; access to proprietary technical and marketing 
information on end users` requirements and on competitors' products; informal sharing of 
technical information and ideas between the flagship and different network nodes; and 
knowledge exchange through informal, transnational peer group networks
11. 
                                                            
11 Of course, knowledge transfer is not a sufficient condition for effective knowledge diffusion. 
Diffusion is completed only when transferred knowledge is internalized and translated into the 
capability of the local suppliers (e.g., Kim, 1997, and Ernst, Mytelka and Ganiatsos, 1998). Much 
depends on the motivations, resources and capabilities of local suppliers (Ernst and Kim, 2001). 
These issues are at the center of current industrial policy debates, and hence are beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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Typically, the flagships` outsourcing requirements have become more demanding. 
Cisco for instance selects suppliers according to three criteria: a solid financial standing; 
high ratings on a quarterly scoreboard measuring performance in delivery, quality etc.; 
and speed of response. The latter is of critical importance: suppliers are expected to 
respond within hours with a price, a delivery time, and a record on their recent 
performance on reliability and product quality. This implies that local suppliers can only 
upgrade or perish. To stay on the GPN, local suppliers must develop their capabilities 
through internalizing transferred knowledge. The only way for suppliers to survive the 
intense pressures imposed by the flagships, is to upgrade from a position of simple 
contract manufacturers (so-called “box shifters”) to providers of integrated, knowledge-
intensive support service packages.  
 
At the same time, network participation can also provide an incentive for local 
suppliers to invest in their knowledge base and capabilities. This requires however that 
the flagship reduces the perceived risk of such investments through a longer-term 
commitment; that network participation provides the supplier with a stable source of 
income to finance the investment; and that the network offers access to superior market 
and technology information that may reduce the risks involved in the investment 
decision. Of course not all networks meet these fairly demanding requirements
12.  
 
3. Impact of the Internet - Assessing Conflicting Claims 
 
In short, under certain circumstances, GPN may provide a combination of new 
opportunities, pressures and incentives for local suppliers to upgrade their capabilities. 
How will an increased use of the Internet to manage global production networks affect 
Asian firms? What new opportunities does this create for managing in Developing Asia, 
especially for local capability formation? And what forces constrain the capacity of Asian 





A pessimistic scenario emphasizes potential negative implications for Developing 
Asia. First, access to Internet-based technologies and organizational innovations is highly 
unequal (OECD, 2000, chapter 3; Ernst and Jiacheng, 2000). Outside the industrial 
heartlands of the U.S., Japan and Europe, fundamental constraints exist to access (spread 
and capacity of information infrastructure), connectivity  (variety of linkages) and 
receptivity (capacity to receive and absorb information). In Asia, for instance, there is 
only one direct Internet link between two Asian cities, Tokyo and Seoul. More than 99% 
                                                            
12 It is now well established that nationality of ownership of network flagships, home country 
institutions and product mix (specialization) explain why GPN differ in their governance 
structures, and hence in the incentives they provide for upgrading investment by local suppliers 
(Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999; Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000, chapter1). 
13 The East-West Center project, mentioned above, assesses these conflicting scenarios, based 
on structured interviews with global network flagships, Asian suppliers and Internet service 
providers.  
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access of Asian firms to broad bandwidth, which is essential for reaping productivity 
benefits. It constrains the region´s capacity to adjust the evolving Internet architecture to 
the specific needs and capabilities of its firms and public sectors. It will also make it 
more difficult to develop a strong regional pool of hardware and software companies that 
provide Internet infrastructure equipment. 
 
Thus far Japan has failed to act as the region’s engine for the rapid spread of Internet-
based changes in business organization. This is primarily due to Japan’s weak economy, 
but there are also important structural constraints at work. The Japanese system is 
resistant to change, and this is amplified by its sluggish political system, high Internet-
access charges, and its lack of a standardized payment system. There are however 
expectations that this will change, as Japan moves ahead with ambitious plans to develop 
powerful broadband technologies.  
 
Japan is scheduled to be the first country to introduce 3G mobile telecommunications 
during 2001. This aggressive schedule reflects the interest of the leading Japanese 
hardware producers who need unified global standards to reap economies of scale. 
However, Japan´s previous experience with its aggressive promotion of so-called HDTV 
(= high-definition TV) standard for analogue systems indicates the substantial risks 
involved: a premature bet on a standard that fails to succeed could very well produce a 
negative lock-in effect. It is also an open question whether NTT-DoCoMo’s leadership in 
wireless Internet  (“i-mode”) will change this picture, or whether this is a costly impasse 




Even within developing Asia itself substantial disparities are now emerging. Most 
notably, Korea’s e-business market is projected to be 2.5 times the size of China’s by 
2005, and larger than the combined markets of Singapore, the rest of Southeast Asia, 
India, and Hong Kong. This reflects Korea’s higher stage of development, its broader 
knowledge base, and its more robust national information infrastructure. 
 
In some ways the Internet may actually increase inequality by further 
concentrating power in the upper strata of business networks. Network flagships and 
first-tier suppliers are under increasing pressure to reduce the high costs of network 
coordination that result from multiple sourcing, duplication of tasks, and excess capacity. 
In addition, suppliers are now confronted with much more demanding requirements in 
terms of performance, efficiency, and speed. All of this may be disastrous for lower-tier 
suppliers who lack the financial muscle and technology to respond to these pressures. 
The Internet may also increase network entry barriers: it facilitates a shift from partial 
outsourcing, which covers the nuts and bolts of manufacturing, to systemic outsourcing, 
which includes knowledge-intensive support services and calls for capabilities that 
lower-tier network participants may not possess. We may therefore see an erosion of the 
                                                            
14 Note that NTT-DoCoMo failed to keep its originally planned introduction date for 3G technology 
in April 2001. 
  10 broad base of the network pyramids—many of the smaller, lower-tier suppliers of 




Alternatively, there are strong considerations that argue for a more optimistic 
view. Placing global production networks on the Internet creates new entry opportunities 
for smaller players, providing them with powerful channels for knowledge outsourcing 
and capability development. Electronic data interchange (EDI), the predecessor of 
Internet-enabled e-business, was a useful tool but was too expensive for smaller firms. In 
the United States, while 95 percent of Fortune 500 companies used EDI extensively, only 
2 percent of firms overall could afford to do so. The Internet is likely to reduce such 
barriers by reducing the costs of communication. 
 
Reduced access costs will enable smaller firms in developing Asia to participate 
in Internet-enabled global production networks while outsourcing most aspects of their 
information management. There are service providers that offer fee-based access to Inter-
net resources for individuals and companies. Web-site design and maintenance can be 
outsourced to specialized third-party companies that can reap economies of scale and 
scope, while application-service providers offer, on a subscription basis, important 
applications such as enterprise resource planning and the management of human 
resources, supply chains, and customer relations. 
 
The opportunity to outsource can make a critical difference, since most Asian 
suppliers to global production networks have little knowledge concerning information 
management. Many do not possess the necessary technology and have been handicapped 
by the financial crisis. They lack the financial resources, the human resources, and the 
knowledge to develop the necessary critical services in-house. For example, the cost of 
building and maintaining an e-commerce website averages between $500,000 and $2.5 
mil-lion per year (plus expenditures for training), well beyond the means of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Outsourcing such services can thus provide the missing link to 
reaping the benefits of network participation, especially for lower-tier suppliers in 
developing Asia. 
 
Another important argument for the optimistic scenario considers the impact of the 
Internet on the diffusion of knowledge. The Internet not only provides rapid and lower-
cost access to information; it can also reduce the friction of time and space for the 
exchange of knowledge, far surpassing earlier generations of information technology. In 
principle, closer and smoother interactions can be established between distant industrial 
sites that are connected within global production networks. In this way, the Internet may 
enhance the potential for learning and innovation among participants by introducing 
inter-active and real-time transactions or other forms of communication that connect 
participants—buyers, sellers, designers, production managers, and so on— 
instantaneously, creating virtual teams that can engage in interactive learning across great 
distances. With the transition from EDI to the Internet, all network participants can now 
  11 interact with each and every other participant. For each of these different interactions, it 
is possible to customize information appropriately.  
 
Vastly improved search capabilities for information and knowledge are now at the 
disposal of even small firms. This implies that the latter can now move beyond the status 
of possible recipients, and can actively search for and shape information and specialized 
knowledge. Global network flagships are no longer alone in their quest for worldwide 
knowledge sourcing. For developing Asia, the Internet provides a historic opportunity to 
benefit from enhanced international knowledge diffusion. 
 
4.  Challenges - The Case of Taiwan´s Acer Group 
 
A Belated Transition to Digital Information Systems 
 
Acer exemplifies an important puzzle that confronts Developing Asia´s electronics 
industry. While being a major producer of electronics equipment and components, 
especially related to computing, the company was late to understand the critical 
importance of information technology as a tool to enhance its operational efficiency. 
During the 1990s, Acer was highly successful in establishing a low-cost and flexible 
approach to the development of its GPN
15. Based on informal, social peer group linkages, 
Acer´s decentralized “Client-Server” model provided considerable flexibility to respond 
quickly to changes in markets and technology (Ernst, 2000). 
 
  However, this model now has reached its limits, not only with regard to cost 
efficiency, but, more importantly, with regard to speed-to-market and flexibility. The 
catalyst has been the emergence of the “built-to-order” model in the PC industry, 
pioneered by Dell and others, that now requires a capacity to combine price leadership, 
quality and customer services with product differentiation and speed-to-market. Severe 
price wars, and especially the emergence of low-cost PCs, put enormous pressure on 
second-tier PC brands: Acer was literally pushed out of the US market and was overtaken 
by Compaq in former strongholds like Mexico. Serious problems also emerged with 
service and support, which are critical in the consumer markets that Acer had targeted 
with its PC models. Acer faces a fundamental challenge: Based on Internet-enabled 
“virtual integration”, the BTO-model is far superior to Acer`s model that had tried to 
combine a broad product portfolio
16 and vertical integration with a decentralized 
management structure based on informal relations. 
 
The Impact of Globalization 
 
                                                            
15 From humble origins, Acer has grown within less than two decades into a global network 
flagship that employs more than 32,000 people in 120 enterprises in 37 countries, supporting 
dealers and distributors in over 100 countries.  
16 Acer´s extremely broad product portfolio covers not only PCs and peripherals, but also 
semiconductors, electronic components, software, Internet services, publishing, multimedia 
content, distribution, and real estate development.  
  12 Probably the greatest challenge to the Acer model came from the rapid geographic 
dispersion of Acer´s production networks to overseas locations, primarily in Southeast 
Asia and China. Out of Acer´s 21 manufacturing sites, six are large volume 
manufacturing sites located overseas: two in China, and one each in the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Mexico and Wales. Equally important are Acer`s 19 overseas final assembly 
and configuration centers that are much more geographically dispersed to major markets. 
Adding further complexity, Acer needs to integrate its networks into the GPN of major 
OEM customers, like IBM (its largest customer).  
 
The coordination of such “networks of networks” requires highly efficient 
communication. Yet, Acer`s external communication with vendors, distributors, OEM 
customers and suppliers continues to rely on informal information systems, based on 
personal contacts through meetings, phone calls, and faxes. Within Taiwan, this system 
worked reasonably well, due to the dense supply network in the Taipei-Hsinchu cluster. 
Once manufacturing moved overseas however, these informal networks could not be 
transplanted. There was no alternative but to develop more structured information 
systems that facilitate information exchange and knowledge diffusion and that help to 
improve coordination 
 
It was only since 1998 that Acer has started to address these problems. Management 
attempted to reduce it product portfolio for OBM products. Simultaneously, the company 
was reorganized along five major product lines in order to improve coordination among 
Acer´s many business units. These moves were accompanied, at long last, by substantial 
investments in formalized, IT-based information networks that were meant to address 
major weaknesses in inventory control and supply chain management. 
 
The Evolution of Acer`s IT Organization 
 
In line with its decentralized business model, Acer`s IT organization was 
characterized by high fragmentation: each business began to build its own information 
systems with functions appropriate to its own needs, but without much concern for the 
requirements of other units, or the whole group. The resultant patchwork of decentralized 
IT systems accentuated the problems that had been created earlier by informal, 
personalized information systems. Top management lacked information on what 
individual business units were doing. Nor was its possible to exchange on-line 
information between units. This increased inventory and stifled quick response to 
emerging problems. It also prevented an effective monitoring of financial performance 
and obstructed strategic marketing. Fragmentation of IT systems also prevented the 
sharing of IT resources across business units, and hence increased the cost of developing 
these systems. 
 
Since 1998, Acer has undertaken various initiatives to introduce Internet-based 
information systems to its PC business. These initiatives have focused on three areas: 
customer relations, supply chain management, and the rationalization of Acer´s GPN. 
Given the sorry state of customer relations, especially in the US, this business function 
  13 required immediate action
17. Supply-chain-management (SCM) has been a second 
important weakness, where Acer was lagging behind best practice, especially with regard 
to inventory and speed-to-market. Acer has decided to implement i2 SCM software 
worldwide




Establishing Internet-Enabled Production Networks 
 
The next and most difficult step will be to extend the Internet to the rationalization of 
Acer´s GPN, but this will be a long and challenging process. This reflects the messy state 
of Acer´s GPN: there is not one network, but a patchwork of networks run by different 
business units, with very little interaction and sharing of network resources. In order to 
get the process of streamlining started, Acer has begun working with major OEM clients 
(especially IBM) to develop close EDI and Internet-based linkages. 
  
As for the other side of the coin, Acer`s links with its suppliers, apparently not much 
has happened thus far. Unifying these multi-tier networks into one global SCM system is 
a truly mind-boggling challenge: some of these networks are overwhelmed, while others 
are underused, and the composition of these networks keeps constantly changing, 
especially at the lower-tier levels. There has been some talk of studying how to develop a 
community network with suppliers. However, catching-up based on purely in-house 




To implement this strategy, Acer has gone through yet another round of 
organizational restructuring, and established the Acer Digital Services Group (ADSG). 
One of its tasks is to invest in and develop Internet-related businesses and to coordinate 
Acer´s operational Internet systems
20. It will be difficult to implement the IT-related 
                                                            
17 The first step was to establish an integrated worldwide customer database, based on Siebel 99 
CRM software. Asia is used as the initial testing-ground: Acer relies on Andersen Consulting to 
model its service business, look at future customer service needs and implement Siebel 99. In a 
second step, experience gained in Asia is then supposed to feed into the revamping of customer 
relations in the US, where Acer is working with a small specialized consultancy to upgrade its 
existing CRM software. Implementation proceeds step by step by region, centered on regional 
data centers (one or two in Asia, one in the US, and one in Europe) and three regional call 
centers (North America, Asia, Europe) that can offer customers 24-hour service. The challenge of 
course will be to transform these regional subsystems into a unified global system built on 
standardized procedures. (Dedrick, Kraemer and Tsai, 1999) 
18 Dallas-based i2 Technologies, founded by Sanjiv Sidhu, is the world leader in an area of 
supply chain optimization known as advanced planning and scheduling (APS). The company is a 
pioneer, since the early 1990s, in preaching the benefits of using clever algorithms to plan and 
optimize corporate supply chains. 
19 The first step was to implement factor planning software in Acer`s US and European plants. 
This is supposed to be followed by the implementation of i2 software in Acer´s main 
manufacturing plants and purchasing offices in Taiwan. 
20 It remains unclear however what are its specific objectives, and whether this new group has 
enough power to push through an effective transformation of Acer`s information organization. 
  14 initiatives that we have described before, due to Acer’ s highly decentralized 
organization. Acer also has little experience in managing IT-based information systems. 
An equally important constraining factor is a Babylonian mixture of hardware platforms 
and software programs, which makes it difficult to inter-connect the existing disparate 
systems so that they can effectively communicate and share information. 
 
Another complicating factor is Acer´s policy to “run Acer on Acer”, i.e. to use as 
much as possible its own PCs and its Altos servers. In principle, this is a good idea, as it 
can strengthen Acer`s capacity to design and manage Internet-based information systems. 
Yet, it has substantial disadvantages in terms of cost and time required. This is arguably a 
major drawback in an industry that suffers from intense price competition and where 
speed-to-market for new products is of critical importance. There is a vicious circle 
involved. Acer`s earlier success with decentralized organization and informal, 
personalized information systems delayed the transition to IT-based information systems. 
This in turn prevented the accumulation of knowledge, through trial-and-error, of how to 
design and implement an appropriate IT organization that can address the peculiar 
strengths and weaknesses of this company. Limited resources prevented an attempt to 
address these problems in a big leap forward. Acer was unlikely to succeed where even 
major industry players like Compaq had stumbled.  
 
5.  What Acer´s Experience Tells Us About Opportunities 
 
Outsourcing of IT Services & Strategic Partnering 
 
This arguably explains why, over the last few months, Acer has aggressively pursued 
outsourcing of IT services and a number of strategic alliances to catch up rapidly and at 
reasonable cost. Let us look at four examples that illustrate what are realistic 
opportunities as well as some potential drawbacks
21.  
 
Entry into the Market for Internet-Based Business Management Solutions 
 
A first step has been to establish a joint venture with an industry leader, Computer 
Associates, to develop software that will enable Taiwanese companies, including SMEs, 
to conduct financial management over the Internet. This enables Acer to collect feedback 
information on customer requirements, and to use this as a base for improving Acer`s 
own information management.  CA wants to penetrate a potential new growth market for 
its business management application software ACCPAC that is well established in the US 
market. For Acer, this venture has three interesting features: First, Acer`s contribution 
will be to provide localization services, marketing, sales and logistics. Its main task is to 
adapt ACCPAC to incorporate Chinese language, as well as Taiwan´s peculiar financial 
practices, laws and regulations. Based on access to the program´s source code, this 
provides Acer with invaluable information on the design of Internet-based business 
management solutions.  
 
                                                            
21 The following is based on press releases at acer.com, and phone interviews. 
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SMEs to establish and manage such systems. This in turn will provide Acer with 
feedback on what is needed to manage and maintain Internet-based management systems. 
Third, the joint venture´s general manager will be a prominent industry executive with 
more than 10 years´ experience with leading companies such as Sun Microsystems and 
Bell Labs. This is likely to facilitate the diffusion of complementary tacit knowledge to 
Acer´s management. 
 
Marrying OEM with Contract Manufacturing: Acer`s Alliance with Solectron 
 
Another way to learn quickly the tricks and pitfalls involved in Internet-based SCM, 
is to link up with one of the leading electronic contract manufacturers. The latter firms 
provide outsourcing services on a fee basis across the value chain, that extend well 
beyond the nuts and bolts of manufacturing. In the process, these companies have 
developed best-practice IT-based global supply chain management systems.  
 
In October 1999, Acer announced an alliance with Solectron, based in Milpitas/Ca, 
the world`s largest electronics manufacturing services company, to jointly provide 
Internet-enabled computer design, manufacturing and service solutions for desktop PCs, 
servers and workstations
22. The immediate objective of this alliance is to accelerate 
speed-to-market for both companies, and to combine Acer`s manufacturing prowess with 
Solectron`s superior capacity for global supply chain management. This will provide 
Acer with low-cost access to critical tacit knowledge about how to run an Internet-based 
global production network (Solectron`s key competitive advantage). 
 
Acer`s Joint Venture with GE Information Services 
 
A third possible approach is to enter the market for Internet-based information 
systems for GPN (“e-commerce services” in industry parlance), by linking up with one of 
the major global players as an Asian junior partner. In December 1999, Acer announced a 
joint venture with GE Information Services, one of the leading global providers of 
interned-based e-commerce services
23. The business plan foresees the venture to become 
the largest service center for business-to-business e-commerce in Asia by 2002. Initially, 
the following mission-critical services are provided for Internet-based SCM: buyer-seller 
matching, appropriate Internet transaction environment, and end-to-end supply chain 
systems. The venture will also establish a “center of excellence” to service Internet 
business users from Developing Asia. 
 
                                                            
22 It is planned to extend this cooperation in the future to encompass laptops, a variety of 
emerging Internet appliances for wireless Internet applications, as well as for Internet-enabled 
built-to-order products where customers are able to customize the final configuration. 
23 As part of General Electric, GEIS has developed information systems for one of the world`s 
largest GPN: more than 100,000 participating firms in over 100 countries, with 293,000 
employees. This has enabled GEIS to become a leading supplier of Internet-enabled SCM 
software.  
  16 For GEIS, the link with Acer provides a low-cost access to the Asian market, in 
cooperation with a leading Asian company with a well-established brand image. From 
Acer´s perspective, teaming up with GEIS is a low-cost approach to learning key features 
of Internet-based SCM. Acquiring this knowledge should help to improve the efficiency 
of Acer`s GPNs. This may also enable the company to enter this market as a quasi OEM 
supplier of certain components of such information systems, both hardware and software. 
This would have fascinating implications: companies from Developing Asia that 
successfully used the OEM route for knowledge outsourcing in manufacturing (Ernst, 
2000a) may now well be able to replicate this approach for Internet-based information 
systems. 
 
Outsourcing of Internet Services for the Acer Global Network 
 
Finally, Acer announced in January 2000 that it will outsource the design, 
implementation and management of Internet services for its GPNs to AT&T Solutions, a 
leading supplier of such services.  
 
The objective is to transform Acer´s six disparate GPNs that run on different legacy 
software programs into an integrated, global Internet-enabled information system. It is 
expected that this will improve the communication flow between GPN participants, such 
as diverse Acer groups, clients, suppliers and dealers, and hence reduce transaction costs 
and time-to-market, as well as exposure to glitches in quality and CRM
24. Called “Acer 
Global Network”, this unified Internet-enabled GPN will cover altogether 58 locations 
worldwide. 
 
Outsourcing is only partial: Acer retains a finger in the pie, in order to increase the 
scope for learning. The Acer Global Network is managed by a task force jointly 
established by AT&T, Acer and Pagic, a joint venture of ADSG (Acer Digital Services 
Group) and Taiwan Cellular Corp., Taiwan`s largest private telecom company. Pagic is 
well qualified for knowledge outsourcing from this arrangement: it has assembled a 
workforce specialized in the development of value-added networking services, designed 
to accommodate the different business models of clients, providing an integrated Internet 
solution. Acer expects  “…to learn the management skills from AT&T whilst building a 
stable global networking system.” (Simon Lin, President of Acer Inc., the most important 
of Acer`s groups). For an Asian company, to achieve such a relatively symmetrical 
outsourcing relationship requires that it has valuable proprietary assets. In Acer´s case 
these are its reputation for flexible volume manufacturing at low-cost and high quality, as 
                                                            
24 In the words of Stan Shih, Acer’s co-founder and chairman: “I am confident that with their (i.e., 
AT&T´s) outstanding expertise we can significantly improve Acer´s global logistics and service 











This paper argues that placing global production networks on the Internet can act as a 
powerful catalyst for upgrading business organization and management in Developing 
Asia. This requires however that Asian firms overcome their reluctance to embrace the 
Internet as a core business function, and that they invest in IT as a strategic management 
system. The challenge is not primarily a financial one - access to funding may not be a 
major problem, as networking equipment vendors and Internet software companies are 
eager to penetrate the region`s emerging markets. The real challenge is to rethink 
established ways of managing that for much of the last three decades have worked well. 
The Internet provides a historic opportunity for the region to catch up in the development 
of structured digital information systems. It provides almost unlimited opportunities for 
the outsourcing of mission-critical support services. At the same time, fierce competition 
within the Internet industry has created a buyers` market - placing Asian firms in a 
reasonably strong bargaining position. 
 
The real issue is how the Internet reshapes the organization of GPN and what this 
implies for the position of Asian network participants. While important constraints 
continue to exist in Developing Asia to access, connectivity and receptivity, the Internet 
can substantially reduce the barriers to enter GPN, especially for smaller Asian 
specialized suppliers. However, lower-tier suppliers without proprietary assets will 
suffer. Most importantly, the Internet is likely to improve substantially opportunities for 
international knowledge diffusion, which could provide a considerable boost to local 
capability formation. Yet again, this will work only for higher-tier suppliers that possess 
specialized capabilities. 
 
Using this framework, we have taken a closer look at one of the role models of 
managing in Asia, Taiwan´s Acer Group. Its experience provides important lessons on 
the challenges and opportunities that the Internet raises for Asian firms. First, IT and 
globalization pose a challenge to idiosyncratic forms of Asian management. Acer´s 
attempt to run a global, multi-divisional and vertically integrated corporation with a 
highly decentralized management system, based on informal social information networks 
has turned out to be unsustainable. Not only did it fail to provide the drastic cost 
reductions required by pervasive price wars in the PC industry. Worse, it left Acer 
vulnerable in areas that were supposed to be its natural strengths: speed of response to 
changing markets, quality and customer relations management.  
 
Second, it is important to understand the competitive dynamics that shape decisions 
on how to use the Internet. In the computer industry, the catalyst has been the emergence 
of the “built-to-order” model, pioneered by Dell and others. Based on Internet-enabled 
“virtual integration”, the BTO-model is far superior to Acer`s model that had tried to 
combine a broad product portfolio and vertical integration with a decentralized 
management structure based on informal relations. Third, a failure to develop an effective 
  18 digital information system resulted in poor coordination among the company´s many 
business units, a situation exacerbated by the informal, decentralized management 
system. This left Acer with little alternative but to move away from an outdated business 
model. A transition was necessary from a decentralized Client-Server model to a system 
that combines increasing outsourcing and strategic partnering with highly centralized 
forms of management control. Embracing the Internet as a key business function has 
facilitated this transition. 
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